Law Offices of James E. Bame
Bar # 204617
22930 Crenshaw Boulevard, Ste. C
PO Box 4107
Torrance, CA 90510-4107
(310) 293-0649 Office
(310) 377-7912 Fax
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PRELIMINARY
STATEMENT |
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In
the interest of relieving some of the financial burden on the taxpayers
of |
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Los
Angeles County, Petitioners argue Respondent, as required by federal
law, |
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must
send a bill for certain means-tested public health care services consumed |
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by
immigrants to those sponsors legally responsible for the costs those
services. |
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Unfortunately,
rather than send a bill to those responsible for paying it, Respondent |
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has
chosen instead to spend additional taxpayer funds to defend a policy
that |
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unjustly,
unnecessarily, and illegally burdens Los Angeles County taxpayers.
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The
Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) imposes upon Respondent an affirmative |
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duty
to seek reimbursement, while the California Code of Civil Procedure
Section |
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526a
gives Petitioners standing to ask the Court to compel compliance with
the |
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federal
requirement.
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Respondent
attempts to avoid this duty arguing:
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REPLY
TO ARGUMENTS
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RESPONDENTS
ARGUE THAT PETITIONERS HAVE NOT DEMONSTRATED STANDING UNDER 526A
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Respondent
expresses doubt as to whether Petitioners are Los Angeles County taxpayers. |
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Attached
as Exhibit A is a statement affirming such, executed by Petitioner
Netkin. |
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However,
due to the short time period between the submittal deadline for this |
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Reply,
and receipt of Respondent's Opposition Brief, Petitioners are unable
to |
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supply
a similar avowal for Petitioner Anderson.
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So
that it may provide such statement, Petitioners asked Respondent to
agree to |
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an
extension of the submittal deadline, but Respondent, in spite of having
asked |
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for,
and received, a similar extension earlier in the present action, denied
Petitioners' |
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request.
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If
the Court desires, Petitioners will provide the names and taxpayer
status of |
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hundreds
of Los Angeles County residents who have recently contacted Friends
of |
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Immigration
Law Enforcement asking to be included as petitioners in the present |
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action.
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RESPONDENTS
ARGUE THAT RESPONDENT'S DUTY TO SEEK REIMBURSEMENT IS OPTIONAL
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Respondent
argues at III. D. of its brief in opposition that it does not provide |
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means-tested
public benefits to immigrants and that because it does not, no duty |
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to
enforce the Affidavit of Support is triggered. Respondent's argument,
which |
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it
bases on a reading of 8 C.F.R. § 213a.1, seems to be that California
may |
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arbitrarily
label some benefits "means-tested" and others not "means-tested," |
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and
whether or not a benefit is means-tested is utterly dependent on this
ipse |
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dixit
categorization by the State of California. (This is unsurprising,
as elsewhere |
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in
its brief, Respondent contends that the section of its website titled
"Notice |
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to
Immigrants" is not a notice and is not directed at immigrants.)
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Respondent's
argument, taken to its logical conclusion, is that a benefit whose |
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receipt
is determined by examination of a would-be recipient's means is not
actually |
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a "means-tested
benefit" unless the State of California has attached |
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to
it the label "means-tested benefit," as divorced from reality
as |
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that
label might be. Conversely, Respondent would have this Court believe
that |
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a public
benefit available to all individuals, without any consideration of
means, |
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is
a "means-tested" benefit if the State of California so decides.
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It
should be evident that Respondent' argument renders the term "means-tested" |
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meaningless.
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Petitioners
maintain that a "means-tested public benefit" is a benefit, |
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the
degree to which is dependent upon the recipient's financial means,
and the |
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cost
of which is borne in whole or in part by the general public.
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Respondent,
nevertheless, concedes that it offers such means-tested public benefits |
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to
people, including immigrants. Gatton decl., 13: 8-24.
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Respondent
attempts to conflate the universal availability of actual medical
treatment |
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with
the limited availability of means-tested public benefits. It asserts
that, |
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because
actual medical care is provided to all individuals who seek it, regardless |
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of
ability to pay, an individual's ability to pay has no bearing on his
receipt |
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of
actual medical treatment. Gatton decl., 14: 8-15. While this may be
true, it |
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ignores
the fact that by Respondent's own admission, some of that treatment
is |
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subsidized
through means-tested public benefits. The cost of that treatment can |
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be
recovered from immigrant sponsors, and, therefore, reimbursement must
be sought.
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RESPONDENT'S
DUTY TO SEEK REIMBURSEMENT IS PASSIVE, I.E., ONLY "UPON NOTIFICATION" |
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THAT
REIMBURSEMENT IS OWED
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As
Petitioners showed in the Opening Brief, Respondent has an affirmative
duty |
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to
comply with the federal law. Respondent only asserts in its response
that it |
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does
not, but fails to address Petitioners' arguments.
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RESPONDENT
ARGUES THAT THE U.S. ATTORNEY GENERAL HAS GIVEN LOCAL PUBLIC SERVICE |
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PROVIDERS
THE RIGHT TO OPT OUT OF COMPLIANCE WITH CERTAIN IMMIGRATION LAWS ENACTED |
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BY
CONGRESS
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As
noted in Petitioners' Opening Brief, the Constitution has given Congress
plenary |
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authority
over immigration law, and, therefore, even if it were true that it
had |
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been
attempted, the U.S. Attorney General would have no authority to countermand |
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Congressional
mandate.
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RESPONDENT
ARGUES THAT PETITIONERS HAVE FAILED TO PROVIDE EXHAUSTIVE DATA
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The
data Respondent complains is absent has been made nearly impossible
to obtain |
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thanks
to the very policies the present action is challenging. Furthermore,
the |
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sponsor
of the Petitioner's action before this court, Friends of Immigration
Law |
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Enforcement,
twice requested under freedom of information statutes the data Respondent |
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now
demands, and was twice ignored.
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RESPONDENT
ARGUES THAT SENDING A BILL TO THE SPONSORS OF IMMIGRANTS FOR HEALTH |
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CARE
SERVICES RENDERED MAY COST MORE THAN THE SERVICES THEMSELVES
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While
the argument seems absurd on the face of it, the very policies Petitioners |
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are
challenging make it impossible for the public to ever find out whether
it |
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is
true. Furthermore, even if it were true, the argument would not justify
flouting |
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the
law.
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RESPONDENT
ARGUES THAT PETITIONERS DO NOT HAVE STANDING TO ENFORCE THE INA
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Respondent
argues irrelevantly that Petitioners have no standing to enforce the |
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provisions
of the Immigration and Nationality Act. Petitioners have only commenced |
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an
action under California Code of Civil Procedure § 526a to compel
Respondent |
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to
collect monies due it and the information mandated by a comprehensive
federal |
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scheme
to regulate immigration so that Respondent does not continue to violate |
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the
provisions of § 526a.
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At
III. C. of its brief in opposition, Respondent, referring to 8 U.S.C
§ |
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1183a(b)(1)
asserts, "Under the plain meaning of the statute, seeking reimbursement |
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from
a sponsor is contingent "upon notification" that a sponsored
immigrant |
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has
obtained services."
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Respondent's
failure to collect information on the sponsors of immigrant patients |
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makes
notification, and therefore compliance with Section 1183a(b)(1), impossible. |
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It
is ironic that Respondent should point out so clearly that Respondent's
inaction |
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forms
the sole roadblock to achieving the goals of both 8 U.S.C § 1183a(b)(1) |
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and
California Code of Civil Procedure § 526a.
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Indeed,
even if it were true that the Immigration and Nationality Act did
not |
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impose
a duty upon Respondent to seek reimbursement from immigrant sponsors
-- |
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a contention
that would require this Court to ignore entirely the Supremacy Clause |
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or
the doctrine of preemption, or both -- Respondent would still not
be relieved |
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of
its duties under California Code of Civil Procedure §526a, which
applies |
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without
qualification to public officials in the state of California, and
which |
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requires
all public officials to enforce the government's duty to collect funds |
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due
the State.
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Respondent,
in urging this Court to adopt the "upon notification" argument |
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mentioned
above, is happy to cite the authority of 8 U.S.C § 1183a, the
federal |
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statute
that authorizes the Affidavit of Support. The Affidavit of Support's
own |
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terms
give Respondent all that it requires to meet its duties under California |
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Code
of Civil Procedure § 526a by handing Respondent a simple contract
action |
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that
could be easily maintained in any California court of general jurisdiction |
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with
reference only to state contract law. The Affidavit of Support states:
"If |
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the
sponsor fails to honor the request for reimbursement, the agency may
sue the |
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sponsor
in any U.S. District Court or any State court with jurisdiction of
civil |
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actions
for breach of contract."
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Without
ever addressing Respondent's duty to seek reimbursement under 8 U.S.C |
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§
1183a, this Court can adopt Respondent's contention that the duty
to seek |
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reimbursement
is triggered by notification, and should find that California Code |
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of
Civil Procedure § 526a requires Respondent to collect immigrant
sponsor |
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information
to make notification possible.
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RESPONDENT
ARGUES THAT THE MEANS-TESTED PUBLIC BENEFITS RESPONDENT PROVIDES ARE |
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NOT
MEANS-TESTED PUBLIC BENEFITS
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Respondent
argues that because respondent first provides the benefit and then |
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ascertains
the means rather than ascertaining the means and then providing the |
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benefit,
the means-tested benefits provided are not really means-tested public |
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benefits.
Such an argument should be dismissed out of hand
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RESPONDENT
ARGUES THAT THE OFFER ON RESPONDENT'S WEBSITE TO PROVIDE MEANS-TESTED |
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PUBLIC
BENEFITS TO IMMIGRANTS IS NOT REALLY AN OFFER TO PROVIDE MEANS-TESTED
PUBLIC |
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BENEFITS
TO IMMIGRANTS
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In
a particularly confusing section of Respondent's Opposition Brief,
Respondent |
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appears
to be arguing that, because the offer to provide means-tested public
benefits |
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to
immigrants was only included on respondent's website in order to counter
"misinformation |
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and
rumors" about immigration law, the offer is not a real offer.
Petitioners |
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respectfully
ask the Court to dismiss such an argument.
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CONCLUSION
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Petitioner's
request is reasonable and lawful. The granting of Petitioner's request |
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would
ensure compliance with the law and would be in the public interest.
Respondent |
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has
failed to demonstrate otherwise.
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Dated
August 16, 2004
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LAW
OFFICES OF JAMES E. BAME
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